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Abstract
The innovation literature states that scientists are core ingredients in creating technological innovations. This paper
investigates whether the hiring of a designer generates aesthetic innovations by a firm. Further we investigate what the
level of design knowledge of the receiving firm means for the firms? absorptive capacity, in terms of turning the hiring of
the designer into aesthetic innovations. We explore a unique dataset containing information on firms, their hiring of
designers and aesthetic innovations measured by design applications (design patents). Our findings show that hiring a
designer does increase firms? likelihood of producing aesthetic innovations. Secondly, firms with prior experience of
aesthetic innovations are more likely to apply for design registrations. Thirdly, there is a positive moderating effect of
firms with prior experience of generating aesthetic innovations on the effect of hiring a designer on aesthetic innovation
outcome.
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Abstract 
The innovation literature finds that scientists are core ingredients in creating technological 
innovations. This paper investigates whether the hiring of a designer generates aesthetic innovations 
by a firm. Further we investigate what the level of design knowledge of the receiving firm means 
for the firms’ absorptive capacity, in terms of turning the hiring of the designer into aesthetic 
innovations. We explore a unique dataset containing information on firms, their hiring of designers 
and aesthetic innovations measured by design applications (design patents). Our findings show that 
hiring a designer does increase firms’ likelihood of producing aesthetic innovations. Secondly, 
firms with prior experience of aesthetic innovations are more likely to apply for design patents. 
Thirdly, there is a positive moderating effect of firms with prior experience of generating aesthetic 
innovations on the effect of hiring a designer on aesthetic innovation outcome.   
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1. Introduction 
On June 28
th
 2007, just 1 day before Apple introduced their first legendary iPhone, 92 design 
patents, covering the design, shape and icons used in the iPhone, was applied for
1
. Apple did not 
only wish to protect the technicalities of the iPhone with patents, but were also aware of the 
importance of the unique aesthetic innovation they had created - an aesthetic innovation covering 
the shape and design of the product. The aesthetic appearance of the iPhone would distinguish the 
phone from any other phone on the market, and consumers would therefore be able to differentiate 
the iPhone from competition by the design. The design patents Apple filed protected the unique 
aesthetic innovation they had created. Apple’s design patents later became the IP at stake, together 
with a number of utility patents, in a series of over 50 court suits between Apple and Samsung 
worldwide. In the US court cases
2
 the jury found that Samsung willfully infringed Apple’s designs
3
 
and patents
4
, and Samsung were found to pay over USD 1 billion in damages to Apple (a verdict 
that was later changed). The outcome of the case led to Samsung, on the subsequent day, losing 
7,5% of their stock value - essentially, exemplifying the importance of aesthetic designs as 
appropriation mechanism. It is not only Apple and Samsung that has seen the light in aesthetic 
innovations, using aesthetic innovations has become a more common appropriation method among 
many firms during the last decade. Aesthetic innovations can be measured by the use of design 
registrations (Filitz, Henkel et al. 2014), and the last ten years US firms have more than tripled their 
number of design patents, outperforming the growth rate in both trademarks and patents
5
.   
                                                            
1
 Designview: www.tmdn.org/accessed the 24
th
 February 2015 
2
 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al, Case No. 5:2011 cv01846. And Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics 
Co. Ltd. et al, Case No. 5:2012 cv00630 
3
 Design patents covering icons such as the "home button, rounded corners and tapered edges" US D593087 and "On-
Screen Icons" US D604305. 
4
 US Patent No. 7,469,381, US Patent No. 7,844,915 and US Patent No. 7,864,163 
5
 http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/country_profile/profile.jsp?code=US!
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The aesthetic innovations are valuable to firms for a number of reasons: first, they lower 
search costs for consumers as a distinct aesthetic aid in product differentiation, and second, the 
design right can be used as enforcement in regards to counterfeit products and cheap knock-offs. In 
such situations design rights are easier to use for example by the custom authorities or at exhibitions 
as they can be observed by looking at the product and no technical knowledge is needed to analyze 
whether it is an infringement (as is the case with patents). Third, the costs of protecting an aesthetic 
innovation by a design registration are magnitudes lower than the cost to obtain a patent right. 
Depending on the country the costs are between 1/10 and 1/5 of the price of a patent and in some 
jurisdictions there is no examination of the design right (e.g. in EU), why the registration process is 
fast and easy, and does not require additional resources from the applicant firm.   
However, if aesthetic innovations are valuable for firm operations and also cheap to 
protect why doesn’t all firms start producing them? What does it take for a firm to be able to create 
aesthetic innovations? From labor mobility studies in the innovation literature we know that 
scientists are core ingredients in creating technological innovations, and that the move of a 
scientist/engineer from one firm to another has implications for both the receiving and departing 
firms’ technological innovation output (Almeida and Kogut 1999, Hoisl 2007, Agarwal, Ganco et al. 
2009, Marc Gruber, Dietmar Harhoff et al. 2013). In this paper we set out to explore, whether the 
story we see with engineers and technological innovations are the same when we consider mobility 
of designers and aesthetic innovations. Specifically, we investigate whether the hiring of a new 
designer generates more aesthetic innovations than a matched firm, which does not hire a designer. 
Further we investigate what the prior experience with aesthetic innovations of the receiving firm 
means for the firms’ absorptive capacity, in terms of turning the hiring of the designer into aesthetic 
innovations.  
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We explore a unique and detailed dataset containing information on firms, their 
employees, their new hires and their aesthetic innovation activities, measured by design 
registrations. We use a matched sample technique and compare firms that hire a designer versus the 
non-hiring firms. Our findings show that hiring a designer does increase the likelihood of aesthetic 
innovations and that firms with prior experience of aesthetic innovations are more likely to apply 
for design registrations. In addition there is a positive moderating effect of firms with prior 
experience of generating aesthetic innovations on the effect of hiring a designer on aesthetic 
innovation outcome.   
Our contribution to the current literature is two-fold. First, we add to the scarce 
literature on aesthetic innovations. Even though the term has been around for a long time 
(Christensen 1995) the determinants for the occurrences and large N empirical studies on this type 
of innovation is scarce. This paper is the first, as far as we are aware, to explore the use of design 
registrations as output measure for aesthetic innovations and link it to firms’ hiring of designers. 
We add to labor mobility research by empirically investigating the mobility of designers and their 
importance for aesthetic innovation outcome.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical 
setting and presents the theory section containing the hypotheses on labor mobility and prior 
experience, as well as the moderating effect of prior experience on hiring designers. Section 3 
introduces the unique dataset and the matching process. Section 4 presents our findings. The final 
section outlines the conclusion. 
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2. Aesthetic innovations and their determinants 
The types of innovations and their determinants have been a main topic in the innovation literature, 
most researched is that of technological innovations (see forexample recent review of determinants 
for technological innovations in Ahuja, Lampert et al. 2008), but also innovations such as 
organizational or administrative innovations have received attention (e.g. Aiken and Hage 1971, 
Collins, Hage et al. 1988, Hage 1999, Ruef 2002), or innovations understood as diffusion, and 
adaptations of new behaviors in organizations (Hage 1999). The aesthetic aspects of product 
innovations has primarily been studied in marketing literature (e.g. Urban, Carter et al. 1986), even 
though it has close ties to the technical aspects of a product (Christensen 1995). Few studies have 
focused on aesthetic innovations as earlier work treated aesthetic innovations as an external layer to 
that of the technological innovation (e.g. Clark 1985).  
In contrast, more recent literature focus on the link between the aesthetic innovation and 
the technological innovation as a central research topic (Christensen 1995, Sanderson and Uzumeri 
1995, Salter and Gann 2003, Eisenman 2013). One example is the recent contribution by Eisenman 
(2013) who argues that aesthetic innovations are an important part of firms’ innovative activities. 
He argues that “visible design attributes, such as color, shape and texture, allow producers to 
explain what their products do and how best to use them, to excite users in a way that generates 
sales, and to extend the basic functionalities of their products by highlighting their symbolic 
meanings.” (Eisenman 2013 p.332), and thereby places the strategic use of aesthetic innovations as 
a key challenge for the commercialization of technological innovations. Production of technological 
innovations alone, with no reference to design, shape, color and texture, might be of less interest for 
the consumer/buyer, as it does not trigger affect (Verganti 2006), which is found to generate higher 
sales (Bloch 1995, Gemser and Leenders 2001, Hertenstein, Platt et al. 2005). 
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In the literature focused on aesthetic innovations, the sources of innovations identified 
and empirically tested are still limited: certain industries are more prone to create aesthetic 
innovations than others (Filitz, Henkel et al. 2014). The properties of the innovation process in 
regards to aesthetic innovations is different from that of the process of inventing technological 
innovations (Tran 2010), and collegial network and teamwork are core to the aesthetic innovation 
process  (Salter and Gann 2003). However, the studies are conducted based on case studies of one 
industry or firm, which limits the generalizability of the results (e.i. Salter and Gann 2003, Tran 
2010).  
On this backdrop we will turn our attention towards investigating which role designers 
play in generating aesthetic innovations. First we highlight the characteristics of designers and their 
working methods, to give reasoning to why designers would be particularly prone to generate 
aesthetic innovations and contribute to the value of firms.  
2.1 Designers and their approach in problem solving 
Previous literature highlights that the problem-solving processes of designers are different from that 
of scientists (e.g. Lawson 1979, Cross 1982). Lawson (1979) reports that designers learn about a 
problem through explorative learning mechanisms of trial and error of various solutions, whereas 
scientists tries to identify the causal mechanisms fundamental for understanding the problem at 
hand. Scientists’ approach to problem solving has been labelled the traditional rational problem-
solving paradigm, whereas designers’ approach to problem solving is labeled design-thinking (Glen, 
Suciu et al. 2014). Schön (1983) observed that in the process of design making, learning by doing 
triggered new stimuli which had a positive influence on the aesthetic innovative process, and that 
designers easily navigated through processes which could be characterized as ill structured. The 
cognitive process in the two approaches, design-thinking vs. rational problem solving, is therefore 
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fundamentally different. Recent literature have highlighted that other educational programs, than 
that of designers, could benefit from using the designers’ cognitive approach to problem solving in 
order to spur more innovative behavior of students and help them to conduct more complex 
problem solving (Glen, Suciu et al. 2014).  
Hereunder, one of the main factors in which designers differ from using the rational 
paradigm is that of combining the exploration and exploitation phase. As Glen (2014 p.657) puts it: 
“Although the design process may begin with some initial specifications, clients and customers 
often do not know what they want until they can see what they can get. This reinforces the solution-
based, iterative nature of the design process.” The designers also differ from scientists in the 
methodology used in the development process, designers often rely on observational and 
ethnographic methodologies (Kelley 2001, Beckman and Barry 2007). Designers are therefore 
expected to be able to conduct a different set of innovative activities, using a different approach 
than that of scientists. They solve innovation tasks that are related to shapes, context and product 
forms, and the effort of building symbols and visual communications into a product to be 
commercially valuable (Buchanan 1992).  
In this respect, we therefore argue that it could be expected that designers, because of 
their mindsets and working methods, can generate value in firms’ innovation activities, in particular 
in relation to generating aesthetic innovations. Below we will argue that if this is the case, we will 
see firms that hire designers having a higher likelihood of generating new aesthetic innovation than 
firms that do not hire. We will argue this based on a combination of knowledge base literature and 
labor mobility literature. 
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2.2 Mobility of designers and their contribution to aesthetic innovative output 
Knowledge is identified as a highly important resource to the firm (Grant 1996, Kogut and Zander 
1996). The firm innovate through a combination of existing knowledge and knowledge new to the 
firm (Kogut and Zander 1992), relying on external sources of knowledge to provide input on new 
ideas, experiences and opportunities. One source of external knowledge to the firm is that of hiring 
new employees, integrating their knowledge into the firm (Lippman and Rumelt 1982, Coff 1997). 
This is often referred to as ‘Learning by hiring’ (Singh and Agrawal 2011). In terms of 
technological innovations, prior research shows that firms use the hiring process to acquire new 
technological competencies and the capabilities to enter new technological areas (Rosenkopf and 
Almeida 2003, Palomeras and Melero 2009, Singh and Agrawal 2011), and as a way of introducing 
new types of products to the market (Rao and Drazin 2002, Dokko and Rosenkopf 2010). Multiple 
studies focus on technical inventors and the impact of their mobility on the patenting activities of 
both the leaving and hiring firms (see e.g. Almeida and Kogut 1999, Hoisl 2007, Agarwal, Ganco et 
al. 2009). The knowledge acquired while working for the old employer is brought to the new 
employer through the hiring process (Pakes and Nitzan 1983, Kim and Marschke 2005), granting 
the hiring firm access to new knowledge previously unavailable internally. Similarly to this 
mechanism, which allows the firm to gain technological knowledge through the hiring of inventors 
(e.g. Almeida and Kogut 1999), the firm can increase its ability to develop new aesthetic 
innovations by hiring new employees skilled in generating these. Our first hypothesis is therefore: 
H1: Labor mobility of designers is associated with a higher probability of the hiring firm to 
produce new aesthetic innovation output. 
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While the process of learning-by-hiring can be used to gain access to new types of 
knowledge, this knowledge may not be directly applicable by the hiring firm. The literature on 
organizational learning has clearly established that the ability of a firm to acquire and apply new 
external knowledge is limited by the firm’s own experiences and expertise (Nelson and Winter 
1982). Learning by doing is a core mechanism for the creation of a knowledge base within a firm 
(Argote 1993), which can then later be exploited by the firm to generate new innovation (Levitt and 
March 1988). The firm essentially follows a learning curve, improving their ability to develop new 
aesthetic innovations through prior experience (Argote 1999), perceiving organizational learning as 
a change in the knowledge of the organization occurring as a function of  experience (Argote and 
Miron-Spektor 2011). This process of learning from experience leads the firm to generate new 
capabilities based on already existing capabilities is akin to what has been termed as ‘competence 
leveraging (Miller 2003, Danneels 2007) . This concept emphasis that learning-by-doing is a core 
mechanism for the creation of the knowledge required for the firm to generate innovations (Levitt 
and March 1988, Huber 1991). This is also closely related to the concept of absorptive capacity 
(Cohen and Levinthal 1990), which states that the firm cannot implement new knowledge without 
prior experience to allow the firm to interpret and understand this new knowledge. Thereby the firm 
that is already experienced with developing aesthetic innovations and registration of the associated 
design rights would be more likely to develop these. 
H2: Prior experience of the firm with aesthetic innovations is associated with a higher probability 
of producing new aesthetic innovation output. 
Engaging in learning-by-hiring to complement the existing knowledge of the firm is 
often focused on the exploration of distant knowledge, rather than enforcing existing competencies 
(Song, Almeida et al. 2003), using a broad search scope to develop new capabilities (Danneels 
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2002) rather than reinforcing existing capabilities. A firm with no prior experience in aesthetic 
innovations will engage in a more distant search process when seeking to develop the necessary 
capabilities to begin developing aesthetic innovations. The hiring of a designer with experience in 
aesthetic innovation will increase the likelihood of the firm to develop aesthetic innovations, as the 
knowledge diffused through the learning by hiring process can provide the missing piece of 
knowledge required as input in the innovation process (Bessen and Maskin 2009). 
 Likewise, firms already experienced with aesthetic innovation can benefit from the 
process of learning-by-hiring. The knowledge and experience required to develop aesthetic 
innovations can be seen as a core asset to the firm. In this case, the new knowledge brought to the 
firm through the hiring process can be seen as a complementary asset (Teece 1986), which in 
combination with the core asset of the firm can create new value. 
 While both experienced and inexperienced firms can benefit from implementing new 
knowledge in their innovation process, the overall impact differs between these firms. When firms, 
not experienced with aesthetic innovation, attempt to implement the new knowledge gained in the 
hiring process, it is not without difficulties. The implementation of new external knowledge is 
associated with multiple challenges to the firm, such as a lack of efficient knowledge sharing within 
the firm (Tushman and Scanlan 1981), resistance to change (Ford, Ford et al. 2008) and 
dissimilarity between the internal and external knowledge bases (Lane and Lubatkin 1998). The 
new knowledge must be adapted to, and implemented in, existing routines and processes (Hoetker 
and Agarwal 2007). In this process, prior experience helps the firm develop the organizational 
routines necessary for the combination of new external knowledge with existing internal knowledge 
(Zahra and George 2002). This prior experience also builds organizational memory, creating a more 
positive response within the organization, reducing potential resistance to change (Walsh and 
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Ungson 1991). Thereby the firms who are experienced with aesthetic innovation will be able to 
apply the new knowledge to re-enforce existing capabilities (Teece 1986), and utilize the external 
knowledge to provide access to new ideas, prompting development of new products (Grant and 
Baden-Fuller 2004). When considering the reverse to be true, that firms without prior experience in 
aesthetic innovation would benefit more from gaining access to new knowledge through the hiring 
process, it can be argued that these firms would see a greater benefit due to having a larger potential 
gain of knowledge. However these firms lack the experience and knowledge necessary to fully 
realize the benefits of the new external knowledge. Prior research has established the benefit of 
prior experiences when applying external knowledge, as highlighted by Inkpen and Pien (2006 p. 
781); ‘What can be learned is directly related to what is already known’. The firms without prior 
experience simply have a lesser ability to internalize and apply new external knowledge due to the 
lack of capabilities, as these capabilities are essentially unlocking the necessary level of absorptive 
capacity for the firm (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Our third hypothesis is therefore: 
H3. Firms with experience in aesthetic innovation, hiring a designer is associated with a higher 
probability of developing a new aesthetic innovation, when compared to a firm without experience 
in aesthetic innovation. 
3. Data and Method 
Data on design registrations collected from OHIM
6
, DKPTO
7 and German DPMA
8
 
made by Danish firms in the period 2000 to 2010 form the core of our data. We draw upon three 
sources of design registrations, as firms operating only in the domestic market tend to register only 
in Denmark, whereas firms with a more international focus register internationally. The data is 
                                                            
"!The Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market!
#!The Danish Patent and Trademark Office!
8
 The national German design registrations (registrations that are applied covering the German jurisdiction) 
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retrieved from OHIM’s DesignView database, covering designs registered in the European Union, 
DKPTO’s PVSOnline database, covering designs registered in Denmark and German designs 
retrieved from the German online database DPMA. These databases use a proprietary internal firm 
identifier, which is incompatible with the identifier used by Statistics Denmark, the supplier of our 
firm and individual-level data, why a manual merging process was initiated based on firm names. In 
collaboration with DKPTO the registrants of these design rights are identified and a unique firm 
identifier is associated with each registrant using the CVR registry of Danish firms. A total of 
10,595 OHIM design registrations, 1,725 Danish design registrations and 521 German design 
registrations were identified and matched to firm identifiers. After having matched the data to the 
available registry data from Statistics Denmark, we are left with 10,243 OHIM designs, 1,665 
Danish designs and 521 German designs, a total of 12,429 designs accounted for by 1,457 firms. 
Design registrations made by individuals without a firm identifier are omitted, as these cannot be 
matched to the firm registry used.  
 Data on design registrations is merged with firm and individual-level data provided by 
Statistics Denmark. The data on individuals and firms consist of a combination of employer-
employee register data from Statistics Denmark (Integrated Database for research of the Labour-
market) from 2000 to 2010, thus containing a panel structure. The employee register data contains, 
among other things, information on the person’s employment (industry, job function, primary job, 
secondary job, degree of unemployment etc.). The employer data contains information on industry, 
whether the company is an exporting company or not, the size of the firm, geographical location etc. 
Most importantly this provides data on the end-of-November employment
9
. The data is structured 
in a panel, with annual firm data on revenue, productivity, exports, industry and number of 
employees as key variables, merged with individual level data that allow us to track the 
                                                            
9
 Statistics Denmark registers the affiliation of an individual once a year in November, whereby we do not observe 
mobility within the year.!
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employment history of each individual within the period of observation. This provides us with 
119,990 observations divided between 15,886 unique firms in Denmark from 2000 to 2010. 
 From the data we see that on average there are 6,026 designers in the Danish 
workforce in one year and Danish firms on average per year hire 430 new designers. Designers 
mostly engage in manufacturing industries and the industries registering most design rights per firm 
are manufacturing and trade & transport. 
3.1 Variables 
Dependent variable: 
Our dependent variable Design rights+3 is a binary variable taking on the value 1 if a 
firm registers a design right three years after potentially having hired a designer. A design is defined 
as: “(a) ‘design’ means the appearance of the whole or a part of a product resulting from the 
features of, in particular, the lines, contours, colors, shape, texture and/or materials of the product 
itself and/or its ornamentation;”
10
 (Article 3 p. 5)  
Explanatory variables: 
Hire designer is a binary variable taking on the value 1 if a firm has hired an employee 
who worked as a designer in his/her previous employment and 0 if not. The hire of a designer is 
measured in November of a given year. The variable is used in the matching procedure and to test 
for hypothesis 1. 
                                                            
10
 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community designs (can be found at 
http://oami.europa.eu/en/design/pdf/reg2002_6.pdf accessed 27th of February 2015). 
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Design right registration experience is a binary variable taking on the value 1 if the firm has prior 
experience in registering design rights and 0 if not. The variable is measured from when the firm is 
first observed in the data, the first possible year being 2000.  
Control variables: 
Various control variables that could explain a firm’s likelihood to register design rights 
are included in the model. We include variables concerned with the firm’s combination of job 
functions of employees and firm specific variables.  That is, we control for the share of employees 
with a law related job function in a firm, the share of employees with an engineering job function in 
a firm, hires of engineers by the firm, hire of other new employees than designers and engineers by 
the firm, the share of designers in the firm in the previous year, firm age, firm size, whether the firm 
is an exporting firm or not, whether the firm is located in the capital area or not, industry dummies 
(Manufacturing, construction, trade transport, ICT and financial) and year of matching. 
3.2 Method 
A potential pitfall in the econometric analysis includes endogeneity problems. The 
question is if firms hire designers with the sole purpose of obtaining more design rights and hence, 
the effect we observe is the firm’s strategy to register design rights and not the effect of the designer. 
We control for this by applying a matched sample method where we match firms on previous 
design rights tendencies, among other variables. More specifically, firms who have hired a designer 
are matched with other similar firms who have not hired a designer. That is, the dependent variable 
used in the matching procedure is hire designer and the following variables are used as explanatory 
variables: A binary variable for whether the firm has registered any design rights in the previous 
year, industry (exact 2 digit industry code), number of designer employees in the previous year and 
firm size.  
15 
 
The nature of our data further allows us to restrict the sample to firms that have not 
hired a designer in the previous three years (2000-2003) or the three following years (2008-2010). 
This is important as the effect we observe consequently is purely tied to the designer hired in the 
time period 2004-2007 and not the previous or following three years.  
A matched sample is created separately for the years 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 and 
pooled afterwards in order to obtain the final dataset. The regression results of the matched samples 
for each year, before and after the matched sample procedure can be found in the appendix. 
After creating the matched sample we have a final sample of 1,078 firms and are able to 
test if hiring a designer has a positive effect on a firm’s rate of aesthetic innovations (design rights). 
Table 1 shows the distribution of hires of designers in each year, where the number of firms is 
consequently double the amount of design hires. The total number of design rights registered in 
time t+3 is 34. 
Table 1: Distribution of design hires, firms and design rights in time t+3 in final dataset 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
No. of design hires 76 118 187 158 539 
No. of firms 152 236 374 316 1,078 
No. of design rights in t+3 3 11 16 4 34 
 
We use final dataset and econometric analysis is carried out using logistic regression 
estimation, as the dependent variable, design right t+3, is a binary variable. Robust standard errors 
are applied in all regression and both the coefficient estimates and odds ratios are presented in 
results table. 
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4. Findings 
This section presents the summary statistics, the results of the regression estimations 
and robustness checks. 
4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. The final sample size consists of 1,078 firms; 
where half of them have employed a designer at time t. 3.2% of the firms register a design right in 
time t+3. Of the 1,078 firms 3.3% have previous experience in registering design rights. On average 
the share of employees with a designer job function is 1% of the total number of employees, with a 
maximum of 9.6 %.  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Descriptive statistics (N=1,078)
Variable Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum
Design right t+3 0.032 0.175 0 1
Hire designer 0.500 0.500 0 1
Have design right exp. 0.033 0.180 0 1
Share of employees w. law job 0.001 0.007 0 0.176
Share of employees w. engineer job 0.021 0.068 0 0.602
Hire engineer 0.196 0.397 0 1
Other hires 0.949 0.220 0 1
Log firm size 4.362 1.382 0 9.559
Share of designers t-1 0.009 0.037 0 0.440
Design right t-1 0.037 0.189 0 !
Manufacturing 0.397 0.490 0 1
Construction 0.043 0.202 0 1
Trade & transport 0.232 0.422 0 1
Financial 0.178 0.383 0 1
Export firm 0.719 0.450 0 1
Capital area 0.316 0.465 0 1
Matching year 2005 1.017 2004 2007
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Table 3 presents the correlations of the dependent, independent and control variables. 
Both the variable hire designer and have design right experience are correlated with registering 
design rights in time t+3, which is a first indication of our hypothesized relationships to be 
confirmed. The variable design right t-1 is highly correlated with have design right experience, 
which is expected as both variables are explaining firms previous design experience, however, this 
means that design right t-1 is not included as a control variable in the models that also contains the 
explanatory variable have design right. 
Table 3: Correlations 
 
4.2 Results 
Table 4 presents the results of the logistic regression estimations and includes both the 
coefficient estimates and odds ratios. Model (1) solely contains control variables. Model (2) 
includes the explanatory variable for whether the firm hired a designer or not. Model (2) shows that 
hiring a designer has a significant and positive effect on the likelihood of registering a design right 
three years later compared to not hiring a designer. The odds ratio suggests that a firm is 2.6 times 
more likely to register a design right at time t+3 if a firm hires a designer. Hence, hypothesis 1 is 
supported by the empirical findings. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
(1) Design right t+3 !
(2) Hire designer 0.0743* 1
(3) Have design right exp. 0.4096* 0.0723* 1
(4) Share of employees w. law job 0.0429 0.0273 0.0402 1
(5) Share of employees w. engineer job 0.0185 0.0520 -0.0133 0.0726* 1
(6) Hire engineer 0.0447 0.1099* 0.0384 0.0110 0.3086* 1
(7) Other hires 0.0177 0.0548 0.0431 0.0256 0.0394 0.1144* 1
(8) Log firm size 0.0481 0.0203 0.0706* 0.0461 -0.0437 0.3262* 0.3420* 1
(9) Share of designers t-1 -0.0043 0.0124 -0.0163 -0.0194 0.2338* 0.0084 -0.0703* -0.1136* 1
(10) Design right t-1 0.3577* 0.0196 0.5098 0.0353 -0.0150 0.0392 -0.0214 0.0302 -0.0035 1
(11) Manufacturing 0.0705* 0.0000 0.1235 -0.0796* -0.0442 0.0775* 0.0761* 0.0605* -0.0600* 0.1316* 1
(12) Construction -0.0118 0.0000 -0.0392 -0.0221 -0.0212 0.0462 0.0490 0.0563 0.0040 -0.0414 -0.1713* 1
(13) Trade & transport 0.0014 0.0000 -0.0043 -0.0525 -0.1352* -0.1437* -0.0624* -0.0310 -0.0632* -0.0265 -0.4459* -0.1160 1
(14) Financial -0.0146 -0.0000 -0.0595 0.0677* 0.3019* 0.0698* -0.0463 -0.0595 0.2209* -0.0401 -0.3777* -0.0983 -0.2558* 1
(15) Export firm 0.0774* -0.0186 0.0933* -0.0009 -0.0505 0.0484 0.0707* 0.0907* -0.0783* 0.0791* 0.3218* -0.2151* 0.0062 -0.2483* 1
(16) Capital area -0.0086 0.0658* -0.0487 0.1269* 0.0542 0.0566 0.0489 0.1428* -0.0689* -0.0280 -0.3155* -0.0153 0.0516 0.1734* -0.0451 1
(17) Matching year -0.0362 0.0000 0.0126 0.0422 -0.0153 0.0203 0.0397 -0.0342 -0.0550 -0.0226 0.0092 -0.0020 -0.0390 0.0141 0.0021 0.0311 1
 (*) significant at 5%
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Model (3) includes the explanatory variable for whether the firm has prior experience 
in registering design rights or not. The results of model (3) show that having experience with 
registering design rights has a positive and significant effect on the probability of registering a 
design right in time t+3 compared to not having experience with registering design rights. The odds 
ratio suggests that a firm is 37 times more likely to register a design right in time t+3 if it has prior 
experience in registering design rights. Hence, the results of the logistic regression estimation 
support hypothesis 2. 
Model (4) shows the results of the logistic regression estimation when including the 
interaction of the two variables for whether the firm hires a designer and whether it has prior 
experience in registering design rights. Model (4) shows that having experience in registering 
design rights without hiring a designer has a positive and significant effect on the probability of 
registering a design right in time t+3 compared to not having experience in registering design rights 
and not hiring a designer. Furthermore, if the firm has both experience in registering design rights 
and hires a designer; the probability of registering a design right in time t+3 is higher compared to 
not having experience in registering design rights and not hiring a designer. The odds ratio suggests 
that a firm is 69 times more likely to register a design right in time t+3 if it has both experience in 
registering designs and hires a designer, compared to not having experience in registering design 
rights and not hiring a designer. We use a Wald test to test having design right registration 
experience only against having both design right registration experience and hiring a designer. We 
find that we cannot reject that the effect of the two variables is the same. 
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To further investigate the effect of the interaction term on the probability of registering a design 
right in time t+3 a graphical plot of the marginal effects is produced. Figure 1 shows the predictive 
marginal effects of the interaction term. The effect of hiring a designer without having design 
registration experience is positive but not significant. That is, our results do not support that for 
firms with no experience in aesthetic innovation, hiring a designer is associated with a higher 
Table 4: Results of logistic regression models and odds ratios 
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probability of developing new aesthetic innovations. However, for firms having experience in 
registering design rights the effect of hiring a designer is associated with a significantly higher 
probability of registering design rights in time t+3.  
Figure 1: Predictive marginal effects 
 
4.3 Robustness checks 
As robustness check we introduce design right t+1 and design right t+2 as dependent 
variables and furthermore carry out negative binomial regressions using number of design rights 
t+1, number of design rights t+2 and number of design rights t+3 respectively as the dependent 
variable. The findings hold when applying a negative binomial model and using number of design 
rights t+3 as the dependent variable. Further, our results hold when using design right t+1 as the 
dependent variable and when using design right t+2 as the dependent variable and applying a 
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logistic regression model. The same is true when applying the negative binomial model. The results 
of the robustness checks can be found in the appendix. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper sets out to investigate whether the firms hiring of a designer generates aesthetic 
innovations and what the level of design knowledge of the receiving firm means for the firms’ 
absorptive capacity in terms of turning the hiring of a designer into aesthetic innovations.  
By exploring a unique dataset on firms, labor mobility of designers and firms’ design 
registrations we find a positive effect from hiring a designer and from the firm having design 
knowledge on the probability of registering design rights. However, in order for the firm to fully 
benefit from hiring a designer, through a higher probability of registering design rights, the firm 
needs to have prior experience in registering design rights.  That is, if the firm does not have the 
necessary absorptive capacity, the firm will not be able to exploit the full potential of the designer 
and therefore the probability of registering design rights in the three-year period after will not  
increase.  
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7. Appendix 
A1. Results before and after the matching procedure for the years 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Before matching After matching Before matching After matching
Log firm size 0.720*** 0.058 0.747*** 0.009
(0.08) (0.12) (0.07) (0.10)
Share of designers t-1 5.132*** -5.392 4.805*** -1.819
(1.91) (4.19) (1.72) (3.85)
Design right t-1 0.926 1.072 1.894*** 0.721
(0.63) (1.17) (0.41) (0.63)
Constant -7.494*** -0.208 -7.204*** -0.058
(0.37) (0.56) (0.31) (0.47)
Observations 9,067 152 9,050 236
!2 -test !2(3) =86 !2(3) = 4 !2(3) =150 !2(3) =2
R2 0.10 0.02 0.12 0.01
Robust standard errors in square brackets ; (*) significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1%
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Before matching After matching Before matching After matching
Log firm size 0.674*** 0.034 0.689*** 0.016
(0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08)
Share of designers t-1 5.778*** 7.465* 6.667*** 4.647
(1.10) (4.26) (1.47) (3.91)
Design right t-1 1.118** -0.456 0.975** 0.517
(0.44) (0.54) (0.49) (0.74)
Constant -6.412*** -0.189 -6.643*** -0.115
(0.24) (0.35) (0.27) (0.36)
Observations 9,240 374 9,173 316
!2 -test !2(3) =172 !2(3) =5 !2(3) =150 !2(3) =2
R2 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.005
Robust standard errors in square brackets ; (*) significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1%
2006 2007
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A2. Robustness check – hypothesis 1, logistic regression model 
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (2)
Dep. var.: Dep. var.: Dep. var.:
design right t+1 design right t+2 design right t+3
Hire designer 1.275*** 0.502 0.870**
(0.42) (0.37) (0.38)
Share of employees w. law job 51.512*** 26.589 61.216***
(19.21) (17.23) (18.84)
Share of employees w. engineer job -0.409 -0.463 0.946
(2.28) (2.44) (2.20)
Hire engineer 0.450 0.613 0.012
(0.42) (0.47) (0.48)
Other hires -0.171 -0.115 -0.767
(1.13) (1.09) (0.85)
Log firm size 0.161 0.168 0.155
(0.16) (0.17) (0.17)
Share of designers t-1 0.527 2.920 -0.451
(4.07) (3.44) (3.36)
Manufacturing 21.423*** 1.979 21.410***
(3.49) (1.62) (3.41)
Construction 21.433***
(3.74)
Trade & transport 20.736*** 2.190 21.231***
(3.55) (1.69) (3.46)
Financial 20.748*** 1.386 21.069***
(3.28) (1.85) (3.32)
Export firm 1.349** 1.425* 1.662**
(0.64) (0.73) (0.74)
Capital area -0.197 -0.255 -0.006
(0.52) (0.50) (0.46)
Matching year = 2005 0.300 0.270 0.802
(0.53) (0.62) (0.67)
Matching year = 2006 -1.083* -0.037 0.844
(0.60) (0.61) (0.66)
Matching year = 2007 -0.468 -0.078 -0.541
(0.56) (0.63) (0.82)
Constant -26.645*** -7.619*** -27.005***
(4.02) (2.45) (3.86)
Observations 1,031 1,031 1,078
!2 -test . !2(15) = 27 !2(16) = 166
R2 0.17 0.09 0.14
Robust standard errors in square brackets ; (*) significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1%
30 
 
A3. Robustness check – hypothesis 1, negative binomial model 
 
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (2)
Dep. var.: Dep. var.: Dep. var.:
 no. design right t+1 no. design right t+2 no. design right t+3
Hire designer 2.488*** 1.139** 2.064***
(0.70) (0.45) (0.46)
Share of employees w. law job 24.393 100.801*** 90.019***
(21.65) (25.28) (17.16)
Share of employees w. engineer job -1.387 3.407 6.374*
(3.91) (4.09) (3.75)
Hire engineer 0.399 -0.361 -1.864***
(0.63) (0.51) (0.64)
Other hires -0.276 -1.386 -3.379**
(1.06) (1.04) (1.35)
Log firm size 0.547*** 0.299 0.391***
(0.17) (0.22) (0.15)
Share of designers t-1 1.826 1.518 12.020
(8.04) (6.51) (10.95)
Manufacturing 2.332 32.235***
(1.67) (3.17)
Construction -19.872*** -18.075*** 29.114***
(0.80) (1.79) (2.62)
Trade & transport -0.488 2.571 32.091***
(0.65) (1.91) (2.75)
Financial -0.021 -0.200 30.514***
(0.85) (2.20) (3.07)
Export firm 2.477*** 2.897** 3.213***
(0.69) (1.42) (0.56)
Capital area -1.276* -0.561 0.522
(0.69) (0.61) (0.54)
Matching year = 2005 1.188 -0.251 -0.428
(1.55) (0.71) (0.77)
Matching year = 2006 -1.694 -1.712*** -1.046
(1.18) (0.65) (0.76)
Matching year = 2007 -1.936* -1.089* -3.220***
(1.14) (0.66) (0.94)
Constant -6.803*** -6.502* -34.914***
(2.57) (3.50) (3.52)
Observations 1,077 1,077 1,078
!2 -test !2(15) = 1,035 !2(16) = 1,818 .
Robust standard errors in square brackets ; (*) significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1%
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A4. Robustness check – hypothesis 2, logistic regression model 
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (2)
Dep. var.: Dep. var.: Dep. var.:
design right t+1 design right t+2 design right t+3
Have design right exp. 4.480*** 4.132*** 3.703***
(0.56) (0.48) (0.50)
Share of employees w. law job 18.525 18.910* 38.698***
(17.91) (10.97) (14.97)
Share of employees w. engineer job 0.861 -0.850 2.018
(2.01) (3.02) (2.06)
Hire engineer 0.754 0.928* 0.195
(0.63) (0.54) (0.57)
Other hires -0.234 -0.319 -0.850
(1.22) (1.17) (0.92)
Log firm size -0.079 -0.051 -0.046
(0.22) (0.18) (0.22)
Share of designers t-1 -2.101 3.297 -1.517
(5.07) (3.90) (3.55)
Manufacturing 14.165*** 0.573 16.950***
(0.71) (1.12) (2.87)
Construction 17.739***
(3.29)
Trade & transport 13.670*** 1.200 16.875***
(0.80) (1.15) (2.91)
Financial 14.141*** 0.691 17.109***
(0.60) (1.45) (2.76)
Export firm 1.137* 1.499 1.569*
(0.64) (0.93) (0.80)
Capital area -0.033 -0.222 0.119
(0.71) (0.64) (0.51)
Matching year = 2005 0.091 0.156 0.682
(0.67) (0.72) (0.65)
Matching year = 2006 -1.591* -0.052 0.905
(0.82) (0.67) (0.61)
Matching year = 2007 -0.998 -0.223 -0.777
(0.78) (0.73) (0.84)
Constant -17.973*** -5.866** -21.701***
(1.67) (2.30) (3.39)
Observations 1,031 1,031 1,078
!2 -test !2(15) = 3,107 !2(15) = 102 !2(16) = 311
R2 0.40 0.34 0.30
Robust standard errors in square brackets ; (*) significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant 
at 1%
32 
 
A5. Robustness check – hypothesis 2, negative binomial model 
 
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (2)
Dep. var.: Dep. var.: Dep. var.:
 no. design right t+1 no. design right t+2 no. design right t+3
Have design right exp. 5.760*** 5.027*** 5.684***
(0.45) (0.46) (0.87)
Share of employees w. law job -6.277 22.944 -1.820
(12.52) (19.41) (13.84)
Share of employees w. engineer job 1.632 1.080 8.522**
(2.26) (2.65) (3.92)
Hire engineer 0.746 -0.167 -0.126
(0.54) (0.67) (0.69)
Other hires -1.253 -1.927* -4.063***
(1.62) (1.04) (1.09)
Log firm size 0.061 0.047 -0.005
(0.17) (0.20) (0.17)
Share of designers t-1 -8.477 4.048 -3.504
(7.29) (6.00) (6.46)
Manufacturing 16.114*** 1.383 16.830***
(0.62) (1.19) (0.90)
Construction -17.022*** 15.313***
(1.28) (1.02)
Trade & transport 15.520*** 2.065 16.674***
(0.60) (1.26) (0.92)
Financial 15.552*** 1.105 15.480***
(0.56) (1.44) (0.68)
Export firm 1.971*** 2.424** 1.825***
(0.58) (1.10) (0.52)
Capital area 0.877* 0.480 1.432***
(0.52) (0.50) (0.51)
Matching year = 2005 -0.496 0.577 1.526*
(0.75) (0.59) (0.79)
Matching year = 2006 -2.596*** 0.132 0.740
(0.87) (0.77) (0.69)
Matching year = 2007 -2.372*** -0.444 -2.579***
(0.87) (0.53) (0.72)
Constant -19.061*** -5.745** -17.751***
(1.65) (2.38) (1.25)
Observations 1,077 1,077 1,078
!2 -test !2(15) = 6,012 !2(16) = 4,214 !2(16) = 1627
Robust standard errors in square brackets ; (*) significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1%
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A6. Robustness check – hypothesis 3, logistic regression model 
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (2)
Dep. var.: Dep. var.: Dep. var.:
design right t+1 design right t+2 design right t+3
No hire designer x have design right exp. 3.900*** 3.625*** 2.945***
(0.86) (0.95) (1.05)
Hire designer x no have design right exp. 0.856 -0.378 0.373
(0.58) (0.54) (0.48)
Hire designer x have design right exp. 5.364*** 4.046*** 4.189***
(0.76) (0.60) (0.62)
Share of employees w. law job 16.757 19.338* 36.831**
(18.04) (11.34) (14.81)
Share of employees w. engineer job 0.836 -0.743 2.131
(2.01) (3.08) (2.06)
Hire engineer 0.516 0.516 0.006
(0.66) (0.55) (0.58)
Other hires -0.405 -0.268 -0.911
(1.25) (1.16) (0.91)
Log firm size -0.051 -0.055 -0.028
(0.22) (0.18) (0.21)
Share of designers t-1 -1.899 3.222 -1.856
(5.51) (3.91) (3.80)
Manufacturing 14.962*** 0.566 16.277***
(0.96) (1.10) (2.79)
Construction 17.067***
(3.21)
Trade & transport 14.325*** 1.192 16.137***
(1.07) (1.14) (2.85)
Financial 14.942*** 0.642 16.448***
(0.90) (1.44) (2.73)
Export firm 1.277* 1.529 1.623**
(0.69) (0.93) (0.80)
Capital area -0.055 -0.220 0.104
(0.74) (0.65) (0.52)
Matching year = 2005 0.146 0.206 0.774
(0.70) (0.75) (0.66)
Matching year = 2006 -1.657* -0.019 0.956
(0.87) (0.70) (0.62)
Matching year = 2007 -0.957 -0.178 -0.725
(0.78) (0.75) (0.84)
Constant -19.283*** -5.764** -21.292***
(1.94) (2.27) (3.29)
Observations 1,031 1,031 1,078
!2 -test !2(17) = 1,591 !2(17) = 108 !2(18) = 245
R2 0.42 0.34 0.31
Robust standard errors in square brackets ; (*) significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1%
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A7. Robustness check – hypothesis 3, negative binomial model 
  
Model (1) Model (2) Model (2)
Dep. var.: Dep. var.: Dep. var.:
 no. design right t+1 no. design right t+2 no. design right t+3
No hire designer x have design right exp. 4.432*** 3.443*** 4.231***
(0.87) (0.82) (1.10)
Hire designer x no have design right exp. 0.945* -1.062** 0.605
(0.53) (0.47) (0.41)
Hire designer x have design right exp. 6.678*** 5.073*** 6.413***
(0.64) (0.48) (1.05)
Share of employees w. law job -9.407 -2.318
(13.66) (14.52)
Share of employees w. engineer job 1.254 1.134 7.873**
(2.23) (2.89) (3.69)
Hire engineer 0.494 0.148 -0.225
(0.53) (0.59) (0.69)
Other hires -1.241 -1.555* -4.208***
(1.41) (0.91) (1.10)
Log firm size 0.084 -0.025 0.007
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Share of designers t-1 -7.268 3.584 -2.885
(7.87) (5.99) (6.27)
Manufacturing 16.392*** 1.296 16.894***
(0.63) (1.02) (0.77)
Construction -12.992*** 15.024***
(0.61) (0.88)
Trade & transport 15.847*** 2.029* 16.428***
(0.68) (1.13) (0.75)
Financial 15.703*** 1.416 15.420***
(0.52) (1.46) (0.57)
Export firm 2.018*** 2.284*** 1.889***
(0.61) (0.88) (0.50)
Capital area 1.022* 0.459 1.434***
(0.56) (0.46) (0.52)
Matching year = 2005 -0.216 0.597 1.383*
(0.69) (0.64) (0.75)
Matching year = 2006 -2.521*** 0.125 0.922
(0.81) (0.78) (0.71)
Matching year = 2007 -2.294*** -0.489 -2.282***
(0.84) (0.63) (0.79)
Constant -20.202*** -5.284*** -18.030***
(1.49) (1.96) (1.20)
Observations 1,077 1,077 1,078
!2 -test . !2(16) = 254 !2(18) = 2,613
Robust standard errors in square brackets ; (*) significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1%
